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Abstract 
 
To date, the validity of empirical Bowman’s paradox papers that employ mean-variance 
approach for testing the risk/return relationship are inherently unverifiable and their 
results cannot be generalized. However, this problem can be overcome by developing an 
econometric model with two fundamental characteristics. The first one is the use of a 
time series model for each firm, avoiding the traditional cross-sectional analysis. The 
other one is to estimate a model with a single variable (the firm rate of return), but 
whose expectation and variance are mathematically related according to behavioral 
theories hypotheses, forming a heterocedastic model similar to “GARCH”. Our results 
agree with behavioral theories and show that these theories can also be carry out with 
market measures.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since Bowman (1980) found that the relationship between risk and return could be negative 
when accounting measures were used, a fruitful research stream on this Bowman’s paradox has 
developed (e.g., Ruefli et al. 1999; Nickel and Rodríguez 2002). The most extended theoretical 
explanation for this paradox has been the consideration of a double risk-return relationship 
(negative for low outcomes and positive for high ones) derived from two behavioral theories: the 
Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and the Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Cyert 
and March 1963).  
Because of the nature of the phenomenon, however, the empirical tests display an important 
methodological problem of lack of identification that does not allow the verification of these 
theories or a means to generalize their results when the mean-variance approach is used (Ruefli 
1999, p. 178). There are two causes of this lack of identification problem. First, if the returns 
distribution is allowed to vary over time, a negative mean-variance relationship for a given 
period can be generated by positive or negative relations in the subperiods (Ruefli 1990, p. 372; 
Lehner 2000, pp. 66–67), which makes it impossible to verify if the discovered relation can be 
applied to other periods. Second, the cross-sectional design is employed in most of the paradox 
studies. In the same sense that the instability of the returns distribution across time periods can 
be a problem, the different returns distributions across firms can cause another identification 
problem (MacCrimmon and Wehrung 1986; March 1988; Lee 1997). Thus, a negative cross-
sectional risk-return relation for a set of firms can be the result of positive risk-return relations 
for firms. Therefore, the behavioral point of view cannot be verified in a cross-sectional 
approach.  
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To solve this problem, we translate the perspective of the behavioral theories on risk taking by 
specifying an econometric model that is indexed by firms. According to behavioral theories, the 
return is considered a heteroscedastic variable because its variance at each time period is variable 
and it is related to the expected return. That is, we estimate heteroscedastic models with only one 
variable (return), but whose first statistical moments are linked. 
We use market measures to test this new model for three reasons:  
1. A relatively new research stream in financial economics (beta’s death) has found a flat relation 
between risk and return with market data (Fama and French 1992), which could denote a 
symptom of behavior theories.  
2. Despite attempts to test the “paradox” using accounting and market risk-return relations, 
organization scholars have not studied the relation at the market level as deeply as the accounting 
relation (Ruefli et al. 1999, p. 176; Nickel and Rodríguez 2002, p. 15).  
3. Using market measures avoids the accounting manipulation criticism (Bowman 1980 p. 25). 
This study offers two main contributions to the literature on Bowman’s paradox. First, we 
provide a heteroscedastic model that overcomes previous criticisms and is an appropriate 
representation of the data. Second, this model overcomes the same tests with market measures. 
This provides an additional step in this research stream because the proof of the behavioral 
theories may also be used in financial economics. Total risk is total risk irrespective of whether 
the decision maker measures it by accounting or market measures. 
In addition, the results allow us to make several conclusions. First, the results are consistent with 
behavioral theories on risk taking. Second, there is no difference between the risk-return 
relationship when accounting or market measures are employed. That is, there would be no 
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“paradox” because the traditional assumption of a positive relationship between risk and return at 
the market level is wrong when equities are individually analyzed. 
The paper is structured as follows: in the following section we explain the identification 
problem, and how this problem can be avoided. Next, according to behavioral theories, we 
develop a new econometric model that overcomes the previous criticisms. In the methods 
section, the sample data, the variables and the estimation methodology are described. The second 
last section shows the results of the tests. The paper concludes with some discussion and 
conclusions.  
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
2.1. The identification problem 
An identification problem arises when the data can be explained by different theories, but it is 
not possible to distinguish between them (Greene 1993, p. 585). This identification problem is 
present in Bowman’s paradox, either where a mean-variance approach is used for testing the 
risk-return relation or where a cross-sectional design has been used in the analysis.  
There are two sources of the lack of identification problem. The first is the possible temporal 
instability of the return distribution. In this sense, the computed mean-variance relationship for a 
period can be the result of elements drawn from a single mean-variance relation, and thus it 
would be the accurate identification of the mean-variance relation. But that relation could also be 
the result of elements drawn from a series of different mean-variance relations, which have 
resulted from shifts in an underlying distribution of returns over time (Ruefli 1990, p. 371). In 
this case, the mean-variance relation obtained is meaningless. Therefore, we obtain an 
identification problem because it is not possible to determine if the obtained relationship 
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corresponds to the first or the second case. Supporting this argument, Ruefli (1990) demonstrated 
that a negative or a double risk-return relationship for a period could be generated by a series of 
positive relations in the sub-periods.  
The identification problem produced by the temporal instability of the returns distribution is 
augmented because both the sample mean and the sample variance are functions of the same 
variable. Therefore, if they are included as two different variables in a regression model, the 
number of variables is smaller than the number of parameters (Ruefli 1990, p. 372; Ruefli et al. 
1999, p. 172; Lehner 2000, p. 66).  
Finally, by regressing sample variances on sample means, a negative relation between the 
independent variable and the error term is produced, violating a key requirement of the 
regression model (Ruefli 1991, p. 1211).  
The second source of the lack of identification, when risk attitudes are used as a basis for 
explaining the relationship, is the cross-sectional design. Cross-sectional analyses have been 
used in most of the studies that have tried to test the risk-return behavioral hypotheses (Lee 1997, 
p. 63). As for the former temporal instability, the differences among the firm-specific return 
distributions permit a negative cross-sectional risk-return relationship, which could be produced 
by positive risk-return relationships for each firm individually. In this sense, it is possible that 
each firm of an industry exhibits a risk-averse attitude, and hence the risk-return relation for each 
firm would be positive. However, it is also possible that the firms with more profitable 
investment opportunities also have the ability of obtaining profits at a lower risk level, producing 
a negative cross-sectional risk-return relationship for the industry.  
In other words, the variation in risk taking across organizations can be produced both by stable 
differences among them that also produce differences in their successes, or from different risk 
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attitudes, as behavioral theories hypothesize (March 1988, p. 6). Therefore, a cross-sectional 
design does not allow the differentiation between one explanation and another. In this sense, 
several organizational papers have demonstrated that strategic differences among firms can 
influence both return and risk. Among these strategic explanations are the diversification strategy 
(Bettis and Hall 1982; Bettis and Mahajan 1985; Amit and Livnat 1988; Chang and Thomas 
1989; Kim et al. 1993), market power (Cool et al. 1989), and the influence of risk on return 
(Miller and Bromiley 1990). Therefore, in a cross-sectional approach it is not possible to state if 
the risk-return relationship is due to the risk-attitude (supporting behavioral theories) or to firm-
specific characteristics.  
The cross-sectional approach has been previously criticized by other authors, who point out that 
it is not a proper method for testing behavioral perspectives on risk taking (MacCrimmon and 
Wehrung 1986; Lee 1997). This criticism is based on the fact that risk attitudes are dependent 
not only on the context of the decision making, but also on various characteristics inherent to the 
decision maker or the organization (MacCrimmon and Wehrung 1986). Therefore, the risk 
attitude is a firm-specific concept. Since a behavioral perspective on risk taking is entirely based 
on changing risk-attitudes, it cannot be properly tested in a cross-sectional design but should be 
tested on a firm-specific basis (Lee 1997, p. 63). 
 
2.2. Overcoming the identification problem 
The second source of the lack of identification problem (the cross-sectional design) can be 
eliminated by adopting a longitudinal approach. Additionally, the longitudinal firm-specific 
design is more appropriate for testing hypotheses based on risk attitudes (Lee 1997), as stated 
previously.  
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Regarding the first source of the lack of identification, Bromiley (1991b p. 1208) stated that the 
most direct way to avoid the problem of the temporal instability is to assume that the returns 
distribution is stable for the period analyzed. This solution, however, presents several problems. 
First, we can assume this stability only for short periods, but not for the long run (Lehner 2000, 
p. 67). Second, this assumption requires that each firm have its own returns distribution in order 
to avoid the spurious correlation (Ruefli 1991, p. 1213; Ruefli and Wiggins 1994, p. 755). Third, 
if a longitudinal approach is used, this assumption contradicts the behavioral theories: the 
stability of the returns distribution implies the stability of its first two moments. Therefore, if 
both the mean and the variance are considered fixed for a period, the variance will be 
independent of the expectation, and hence it makes no sense to test the hypothesis that the 
variance is dependent on the expected return.  
In conclusion, another solution, different from time stability, must be used. Ruefli et al. (1999) 
propose the use of alternative measures of risk for overcoming the identification problem. In this 
sense, various works have employed such variables, for example, the variance of the forecasts of 
analysts (Bromiley 1991a), content-analysis-based measures (Bowman 1984; Lee 1997), ordinal 
risk (Collins and Ruefli 1992) and downside risk (Miller and Leiblein 1996).  
A third solution is to recover the variance as the principal risk measure. Variance is the risk 
measure most often used by different research streams, not only by Bowman’s paradox. It is 
easily calculated and is easily understood by both the scientific and managerial views. Its only 
problem is the criticism in relation to the lack of identification of the models considered above. 
According to this solution, it would be possible to develop a model with a single variable (the 
firm rate of return), whose first two statistical moments could be related, as behavioral theories 
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predict. In this way, variance and expectation of returns would be estimated without employing 
the sample variance and/or the sample mean. 
In summary, all identification problems can be solved if the model meets three requirements. 
First, it must be a firm-specific longitudinal model, where expectation and variance can change 
across time. Second, it must be a heteroscedastic model, for allowing the change of variance with 
time. Third, the expectation and the variance are linked in the returns distribution, but not as two 
different variables in a regression model.  
 
2.3. Model development 
The Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and the Behavioral Theory of the Firm 
(Cyert and March 1963) are the two behavioral theories employed by researchers of Bowman’s 
paradox for explaining the risk-return relationship. Both theories coincide in the existence of a 
double risk-attitude, which results in a double risk-return relationship. 
We define the evolution of the return variable on the time to develop a new econometric model. 
Without loss of generality, we accept as a first assumption that returns evolve over time 
following an auto-regressive time -series model, as described in equation (1),  
( ) itnitititit RRRfR e+= --- ,...,, 21  (1) 
where Rit is the return for firm i in period t; Rit-1, Rit-2 … Rit-n are the rates of return obtained in 
the n previous periods; å it is the error term, normally distributed with zero mean and finite 
variance.  
According to behavioral theories, at the beginning of a period, managers estimate the expected 
return for that period (Cyert and March 1963, p. 163). This expected return is obtained by 
estimating, at period t-1, the expectation of equation (1) for period t: 
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( ) ( )[ ] ( )nititititnititittitt RRRfRRRfERE -------- =+= ,...,,,...,, 212111 e  (2) 
When the expected return for period t is estimated, the real rates of return, obtained in the 
previous periods, are already known, and therefore they are constants, not random variables.  
To estimate the risk for each period, we calculate the variance of equation (1) for each period. 
Since the previous rates of return are constant at the period t, the variance of returns is equal to 
the variance of the error term: 
( ) ( )ittitt R ess 2 12 1 -- =  (3) 
Following the arguments of behavioral theories, managers compare the returns expectation with 
the return level they aspire to (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, p. 277; Cyert and March 1963, p. 
169). We denote this aspiration level by Ait. This comparison between the expected return and 
the aspiration level determines the amount of risk the managers will accept at the period t.  
Thus, if the expected return is greater than the aspiration point, managers exhibit a risk-averse 
attitude (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, p. 279; Cyert and March 1963, pp. 166–167), which 
implies a positive risk-return association. In other words, the higher the expectation, the higher 
the variance. On the other hand, if the expectation falls below the aspiration point, the risk 
attitude is risk seeking, being the risk taken higher when the expected return is lower (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1979, p. 279; Cyert and March 1963, p. 167). In conclusion, the distance (positive 
or negative) between the expected return and the aspiration is positively related with the risk 
level. Therefore, the minimum risk is reached when the expectation equals the aspiration 
(Gooding et al. 1996; Lehner 2000). This double risk-return relationship is graphically explained 
in Figure 1.  
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Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
If we translate this risk-taking process to an econometric model, we start by assuming that each 
firm has a minimum risk level, denoted by ó2(å i). This minimum level is firm specific and 
depends on firm-specific characteristics, such as competitive advantage, consumer orientation, 
market power, and diversification strategy. This minimum risk is assumed constant over the 
period considered.  
As explained above, the variance of returns at any period is equal to the minimum risk level 
when the expected return exactly equals the aspiration point: 
( ) ( ) ( )iittititt ARE eses 22 11 0 =Þ=- --  (4) 
If the expected return is greater than the aspiration point, the risk level is also greater than the 
minimum risk level. Following the behavioral theories, the greater the distance between the 
aspiration point and the expectation, the greater the distance between the risk level of the period 
and the minimum risk level. For simplicity, we assume that both distances are proportional. 
Analytically: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]itittiiitt
itittiiittititt
ARE
AREARE
-×+=
Þ-×=-Þ>-
--
---
11
22
1
11
22
11 0
beses
beses
 (5) 
where â1i denotes the relation between the expectation-aspiration distance and the actual risk 
level-minimum risk level distance.  
On the other hand, when the expected return falls below the target level, the managers also 
increase risk. Once again, the distance between the actual risk level and the distance between 
aspiration and expectation are assumed to be proportional. Analytically: 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]ittitiiitt
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beses
 (6) 
equations (4), (5) and (6) show the double risk-return relationship predicted by the behavioral 
theories. Nevertheless, we obtain a single risk-return equation that resumes these relations in the 
next equation (sign function): 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]ittitiititittiitiitt REAdAREd 121122 1 1 --- -××-+-××+= bbeses  (7) 
where dit is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the expected return at the period t is higher 
than the aspiration level, and zero otherwise. Two different parameters, â1i and â2i, have been 
employed for the positive and negative distances because prospect theory postulates a different 
reaction to both kinds of distances. In fact, prospect theory indicates that the reaction to negative 
distances is higher than the reaction to positive ones (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). These 
different behaviors for positive and negative outcomes have been previously tested by 
Fiegenbaum (1990), whose results supported this asymmetric reaction.  
In summary, this econometric model describes the behavior of a single variable – the firm rate or 
return – through a time-series model (equation 1) with a heteroscedastic problem (equation 7).  
The estimation of beta parameters establishes if the behavioral theories are supported or not. 
Thus, if both beta parameters are significantly greater than zero, the behavioral perspective on 
risk taking is supported. If â1i is positive and â2i negative, the positive relationship between risk 
and return is obtained.  
 
3. METHODS 
3.1. Database  
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The database is composed of those firms that form the Standards and Poor’s 100 index in the 
revision of February 2002, for the period between 1-1-1990 and 1-1-2001. Those firms with at 
least 500 valid observations were selected, making a final sample of 98 firms, ranging from 3651 
to 1367 observations for the variation of the return measure. The adjusted stock prices used to 
compute the variables were obtained from Commodity Systems Inc.  
 
3.2. Measures  
In contrast with most traditional papers on Bowman’s paradox, this paper employs risk and 
return measures based on stock market data. Three reasons justify the use of market data. First, 
few studies have employed market measures for studying the paradox. To our knowledge, the 
only previous attempts that have studied the “paradox” using market variables are Fiegenbaum 
and Thomas (1986), Miller and Bromiley (1990), and Veliyath and Ferris (1997). However, the 
results have been contradictory. Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1986) tested the relationship between 
the beta parameter and accounting return, finding a positive relationship between them. Miller 
and Bromiley (1990) used a stock risk measure, which included both systematic and 
unsystematic risk, but they found no influence of stock risk on performance, nor performance 
influence on stock risk. Finally, Veliyath and Ferris (1997) found a flat relationship between 
accounting return and the beta parameters, but a significant negative relationship between 
accounting return and the total risk, as measured by the stock returns variance.  
Second, the validity of the traditional positive relationship at the market level has been 
challenged since Fama and French (1992), who found a flat relationship between the beta 
parameters and stock returns. Therefore, since the positive relationship at the market level is 
seriously questioned, it is interesting to apply the explanations given to the paradox to the risk-
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return relationship at the market level. The use of market measures by strategic researchers is not 
new, although accounting returns are commonly considered more directly under managerial 
control (Bettis and Mahajan 1982, p. 785). Many authors have employed market-based measures 
for both dimensions, especially when the maximization of the stockholder wealth is taken as the 
primary objective of the firm (Naylor and Tapon 1982; Ruefli et al. 1999, p. 173).  
Third, the use of market measures avoids the criticism that the “paradox” could result from the 
managerial manipulation of the accounting information (Bowman 1980 p. 25). 
 
Measure of return 
The total annual rate of return measure, which has been frequently used in previous literature 
(e.g., Abowd 1990; Miller and Bromiley 1990; Bloom and Milkovich 1998), can be defined as 
follows: 
365
365
-
--=
it
itit
it P
PP
R
 (8) 
where Rit is the annual return for a common stock of firm i at day t; Pit is the closing price for a 
common stock of firm i at day t; and Pit-365 is the closing price for that stock in the same day, but 
the year before. If the stock did not quote on that date, the nearest previous price was used, and 
both prices were adjusted for eliminating capital variations and dividends. This return measure 
was calculated for each day between 1/1/91 and 12/31/00. 
 
Expected return 
The function described in equation (1) must be calculated to estimate the expected return. For 
simplicity, the selected time-series model is assumed to be the first-order auto-regressive 
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integrated (ARI(1)) model. This model is selected because it is the simplest model that fits the 
available data for all firms, using Box-Jenkins methodology. Therefore, equations (1) and (2) can 
be re-written in the following way: 
( ) itititiiitit RRbaRR e+-×+=- --- 211  (9) 
( ) ( )2111 ---- -×++= ititiiititt RRbaRRE  (10) 
The estimation of model (10) offers values for the parameters, ai and bi,, that permit the 
estimation of the expected return for each firm individually at any period. 
 
Risk measure  
The risk measure for the model is defined in equation (7). Although the most widely used market 
risk measure in the strategic-management literature has been the systematic risk (Ruefli et al. 
1999), we have employed a total risk measure: the total variance of returns. 
There are various reasons for using the total risk measure instead of systematic risk. The first is 
that the variance of returns is a more appropriate proxy for the managerial perspective on risk 
than the systematic risk (Veliyath and Ferris 1997, p. 220). Thus the CAPM considers only the 
systematic risk because stockholders can reduce the firm-specific unsystematic risk to zero by 
simply diversifying their portfolio by buying additional shares. However, managers cannot 
eliminate the unsystematic portion of risk because they are concerned with firm-specific risks, 
and they do not have the opportunity of diversifying them in the same sense as stockholders 
(Veliyath and Ferris 1997, pp. 219–220). Therefore, the total risk is a more appropriate measure 
for the managerial concept of risk. On the other hand, the managerial control over systematic risk 
is theoretically less than that over the total risk, since the systematic risk depends not only on 
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managerial actions, but also on market-wide factors (Naylor and Tapon 1982; Veliyath and 
Ferris 1997).  
In addition to the former problems, several researchers in financial economics have obtained a 
flat relationship between systematic risk and return, especially from Fama and French (1992). 
One of the explanations for this flat relationship is that the beta parameter of the CAPM cannot 
capture all the systematic risk factors that can influence the stock returns (e.g., Fama and French 
1993; Jegadeesh and Titman 1993; Davis, 1994; Lakonishok et al. 1994; Wang 2000). If this 
explanation is accepted, the traditional systematic risk measure (the beta parameter from the 
CAPM) does not capture all the risk factors, and, therefore, it cannot be a proper measure of risk 
(Ruefli et al. 1999, p. 172).  
Finally, recent studies in financial economics have noted the existence of serious methodological 
problems in calculating the systematic measure of risk empirically. Roll and Ross (1994) 
demonstrated that a mean-variance efficient market index is necessary for obtaining good 
estimation of the systematic model. Nevertheless, since it is impossible to verify empirically this 
fact, the practical use of the CAPM theory is severely limited (Roll and Ross 1994, p. 111). 
In summary, all these important problems with the beta parameter suggest that the variance of 
market return should be selected as the risk measure rather than systematic risk.  
 
Aspiration point 
The aspiration level (or target level for prospect theory) must be defined to test the model. The 
two aspiration levels most commonly used by researchers are the social aspiration level and the 
historical aspiration level (Greve 1998). The first is imposed upon the performance of the firms 
of the same industry, the most commonly used measure in previous works being the mean or 
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median performance of the industry (e.g., Fiegenbaum and Thomas 1988; Fiegenbaum 1990; 
Jegers 1991; Bromiley 1991a; Miller and Leiblein 1996). The historical aspiration level is a firm-
specific level, based upon the historical performance of the same firm, generally being the 
previous performance level (Bromiley 1991a; Miller and Leiblein 1996; Lee 1997; Palmer and 
Wiseman 1999). 
The aspiration concept employed in this work is the historical aspiration level. The measure 
chosen as the aspiration point is the previous rate of return, Rit-1. This selection is based on two 
reasons. First, the historical aspiration level seems to be more consistent with the postulates of 
prospect theory than the social aspiration level (Lee 1997, p. 62): Prospect theory posits the 
status quo of a firm’s performance as the reference point, so this status quo is more easily 
identifiable with the previous performance than with the mean or median performance of the 
industry.  
Second, several authors have demonstrated that the risk-return relationship is better explained 
when firm-specific target levels are used instead of aspiration levels common for all the firms 
(Gooding et al. 1996; Lehner 2000). 
 
3.3. Statistical methodology 
With all the characteristics developed above, the final model is: 
( ) itititiiitit RRbaRR e+-×+=- --- 211  (11) 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]ittitiititittiitiitt RERdRREd 11211122 1 1 ----- -××-+-××+= bbeses  (12) 
where Rit is the only real variable at the period t; Rit-1 is the value of the aspiration level; dit is an 
artificial variable to design the sign function; and ai,  bi, b1i, b2i, and s2(e i) are the parameters of 
the model to be estimated. 
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The most relevant characteristic of this model is its heteroscedasticity, that is, the variance of the 
error term is not constant for all the time periods, but its changes over time depending on the 
difference between the expected return and the aspiration (Rit-1). This heteroscedasticity makes 
ordinary least-squares regression an inefficient method of estimation. In this paper, the maximum 
likelihood method is used to estimate the parameters.  
The maximization of the log-likelihood function is obtained using the Large-Scale GRG Solver 
Engine of Frontline Systems. Appendix 1 describes in detail the development of the log-
likelihood function for the model, as well as the maximization process.  
The Wald statistic is calculated to test if the model and the parameters are significant. The Wald 
test has the advantage over other alternative tests (e.g., likelihood ratio or Lagrange multiplier) 
because the log-likelihood has to be maximized only once. The formulation of the Wald statistic 
is presented in Greene (1993 pp. 379-381). The BHHH method (Berndt, Hall, Hall and Hausman 
1974) is followed to estimate the variances of the parameters because they are necessary for the 
computation of the Wald statistic. This method has some advantages over alternative methods, 
such as the efficiency of operations, and it avoids the approximation errors in the empirical 
results (Greene 1993, pp. 115-116).  
 
4. RESULTS 
As explained above, the estimation of beta parameters establishes whether the behavioral 
theories are supported or not. Thus if both beta parameters are significantly greater than zero, the 
behavioral perspective on risk taking is supported. If b1i is positive and b2i negative, the positive 
relationship between risk and return is obtained.  
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Table 1 shows the estimates of the parameters, ai,  bi,  ó2(å i), b1i and b2i, for each firm in the 
sample, their significance levels, and their standard errors (in parentheses), as well as the Wald 
statistic for the whole model.  
These results show that the econometric model is significant for all the firms (p-value<0.0001), 
supporting the general validity of the model. Regarding the expectation equation, the estimates 
for the parameters ai and bi are significant in most of the cases (80 and 97 out of the 98 firms of 
the total sample). Only one firm (BHI) shows a non-significant value for bi, although, as we see 
later, this firm also has outlier values for the other parameters.  
The estimates for â1i and â2i are positive for the majority of the firms. In fact, the â1i-estimates 
are significantly positive (at the 0.01 level) for 95 cases, which suggest only three exceptions 
(BHI, HIG and LU). However, HIG and LU do not contradict the assumptions of the behavioral 
theories because their b1i estimates are not significantly different from zero. On the other hand, 
the â2i-estimates are significantly greater than zero for 97 firms, the only exception being BHI. 
As noted above, BHI constitutes the main exception for the model, since the estimates for both 
â1i and â2i are negative, although only the first one is significantly less than zero, at the 0.001 
level. The non-significant estimate obtained for the parameter bi makes us consider that this firm 
is the only real exception to the general acceptability of our model. However, we have to say that 
this firm is also an outlier to traditional financial economic thought because its behavior goes in 
the opposite direction to a positive relationship between risk and return. 
In conclusion, with the exception of BHI, the empirical results generally support the behavioral 
hypotheses about the risk-return relationship when market data are used in 99% of the firms: the 
greater the distance between the expected return and the aspiration – independent of the sign of 
that relation – the greater the increase in the risk of the firm.  
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On the other hand, Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, p. 279) postulates that the 
value function for decision makers is steeper for losses than for gains. This is translated into a 
steeper risk-return relationship, when the expected outcomes do not reach the aspiration point 
(Fiegenbaum 1990, p. 191). However, our results do not support a different relationship between 
losses and gains. For our empirical results, only 40 of the 98 firms have â2i-estimates greater than 
the â1i-estimates.  
Finally, the minimum risk parameter, s2(å i), has significant estimates for all the firms, including 
the outlier BHI. This minimum risk ranges between 0.007% (AEP) and 0.202% (NXTL). A 
curious characteristic of these results is the low range of values for the estimates for this 
parameter, because, in terms of the standard deviation, all the values range from the 0.82% and 
the 4.49% levels.  
In summary, the model has significant estimates in every case, with only three cases in which the 
beta estimates were not significant to support the double behavioral relationship, or because of 
the negative â1i-estimate, in the case of BHI. These results allow us to conclude that the model 
can be applied using market measures in studies of risk taking by firms. 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our paper deals with two of the most important problems associated with research on Bowman’s 
paradox: the identification problem and the lack of evidence at the market level.  
Regarding the first problem, we discuss the two sources for lack of identification: the temporal 
instability of the returns distribution and the cross-sectional design of research. We also provide 
an econometric model that solves both problems: first, it is a longitudinal firm-specific model, 
avoiding the cross-sectional problem when behavioral theories are to be tested. Second, in this 
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model, only one variable is used – the firm rate of return – but it involves heteroscedastic 
variances, which are dependent on the distance between the expected value of the return and the 
aspiration point.  
The second problem is the lack of research about the paradox at the market level. This lack of 
research is even more surprising since research in financial economics is also challenging the 
traditional positive risk-return relation (called “beta’s death”), and whose evolution is very 
similar to Bowman’s paradox research (Nickel and Rodríguez 2002, p. 14). Besides, the works 
that have tried to use market measures have reached contradictory results.  
The results obtained with our model, using market measures, are consistent with the behavioral 
perspective on risk taking: there is a positive risk-return relationship between risk and return 
when the expected return exceeds the aspiration point, and a negative relationship when the 
expected return falls below the aspiration point.  
This result has important implications for the research about the paradox and “beta’s death”. 
First, if we accept that the behavioral perspective is obtained with accounting measures of risk 
and return, we have found that the same double relationship occurs at the market level. 
Therefore, there is no difference between the risk-return relationship at the market and the 
accounting level, and hence there is no “paradox”. Simply, the traditional assumption of a 
positive relationship, at the market level, is not supported, but there is evidence of a double 
relationship as behavioral theories predict.  
Second, the research on “beta’s death” tries to explain why the relationship between beta and 
return is flat. Several reasons have been employed: from the impossibility of testing empirically 
the CAPM (Roll and Ross 1994), to the necessity of using additional variables for capturing 
systematic risk factors that the beta parameter does not capture (Fama and French 1993; 
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Jegadeesh and Titman 1993; Davis 1994; Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny 1994; Wang 2000). 
Nevertheless, in all these works the idea of a positive relationship between return and the proper 
measure of risk is still assumed, because all these works start from an assumption of risk 
aversion. Although our empirical results cannot be taken as direct explanation for the lack of an 
empirical relation between systematic risk and return, since the risk measure employed has been 
the variance and not the systematic risk, they point to an alternative explanation for the flat 
relationship between beta and returns: the existence of risk-seeking attitudes when the outcomes 
are too small. Further research with systematic and unsystematic risk measures, and allowing 
risk-seeking attitudes, as Prospect Theory and Behavioral Theory hypothesize, could throw some 
light on “beta’s death”. Thus, it would be interesting to know if the behavioral risk taking affects 
the systematic and unsystematic portions of risk in the same or in a different way.  
The values obtained for the minimum risk measure are interesting for our model. This measure 
shows the portion of the variance that does not depend on the difference between the expectation 
and the aspiration point. The sources of this minimum risk are found in the previous literature 
about Bowman’s paradox. For example, the product or consumer orientation (Bowman 1980; 
Bettis and Mahajan 1985), market power (Cool et al. 1989), and the diversification strategy 
(Bettis and Hall 1982; Bettis and Mahajan 1985; Chang and Thomas 1989; Kim et al. 1993) have 
previously been employed to explain the different risk taking among firms. In this sense, an 
interesting line of research would be the analysis of how the firm-specific or industry-specific 
characteristics influence the amount of minimum risk of the firm.  
In addition to the former line of research, the differences between the beta parameters of our 
heteroscedastic model among firms can provide some interesting ways for future investigation. 
As the previous literature suggests (McCrimmon and Wehrung 1986; Lee 1997), the degree of 
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risk avoidance or risk propensity is firm specific, as the different estimates obtained for the beta 
parameters demonstrate. Therefore, it would be worth studying why some firms exhibit more 
extreme attitudes toward risk than others (and then, their beta values are higher), i.e., what firm-
specific or industry-specific characteristics determine the slope of the risk-return relationship, 
and in what measure they determine it.  
Finally, our work presents a limitation that should be solved in future works. Although, 
theoretically, the proposed model could be applied to both market and accounting data, the 
technical estimation procedure (maximum likelihood) requires a very large number of 
observations. This large number of observations is almost impossible to obtain with accounting 
data, since the periodicity of the data is, at best, three months. A possible solution would be to 
employ a long historical series of accounting data, but in this case it would be much more 
difficult to justify the stability of the model.  
 
Appendix 1.  
Log-likelihood function of the model 
The mean and the variance of the returns variable for each moment are defined by equations (11) 
and (12): 
( ) ( )2111 ---- -×+=- ititiiititt RRbaRRE   (11) 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]ittitiititittiitiitt RERdRREd 11211122 1 1 ----- -××-+-××+= bbeses  (12) 
Since it is assumed that e it is normally distributed, with mean equal to zero and variance equal to 
s2(e it), the density function of e it is the following: 
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The likelihood function of the sample of n observations of the e its, assuming that they are 
uncorrelated, is: 
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Finally, the log-likelihood function is the following: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )åå == -×--=
n
t it
it
n
t
iti
n
L
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
ln
2
1
2ln
2
)ln(
es
e
esp
 (15) 
Finally, by substituting in equation (15) the value of the error term and the variance equation, we 
obtain the final equation of the log-likelihood function: 
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The maximization process of this function is made following three steps: first, initial values for 
parameters of the first equation (ai and bi) were estimated using ordinary least squares. Although 
ordinary least-squares regression does not offer good estimates of the parameters when there is 
heteroscedasticity, they can be used as starting points in the maximization process. Using these 
first estimates, the error terms were calculated. In the second step, first estimates of the 
parameters of the variance equation were also obtained by ordinary least squares. Finally, using 
the former estimates as starting points, the log-likelihood function was maximized using the 
Large-Scale GRG Solver Engine of Frontline Systems with the multi-start method. The multi-
start method allows the program to start the search from different starting points, reaching 
different locally optimal solutions, and selecting the best of these as the proposed globally 
optimal solution.  
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Assuring that the model obtained positive values of s2(e it) for each period, the following three 
constraints were added to the model: 
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Table 1. Firm-specific estimates of parameters of the econometric model  
Ticker ai bi s2(å i) b 1i b 2i Wald statistic 
AES 0.00005 
(0.00001) 
**** -0.01996 
(0.00068) 
**** 0.00050 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.72450 
(0.03925) 
**** 0.72487 
(0.03319) 
**** 1690.64 **** 
AOL -0.00030 
(0.00001) 
**** 0.02379 
(0.00035) 
**** 0.00034 
(0.00001) 
**** 1.92474 
(0.07790) 
**** 0.72821 
(0.01370) 
**** 8115.53 **** 
T -0.00001 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00171 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00019 
(0.00000) 
**** 19.52872 
(0.21643) 
**** 6.02938 
(0.07256) 
**** 244877.60 **** 
AA 0.00000 
(0.00004) 
 0.08737 
(0.00318) 
**** 0.00020 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.09425 
(0.00544) 
**** 0.08926 
(0.00528) 
**** 1340.65 **** 
AEP -0.00002 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00684 
(0.00017) 
**** 0.00007 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.84881 
(0.03135) 
**** 0.44040 
(0.01588) 
**** 3183.23 **** 
AXP 0.00004 
(0.00001) 
*** -0.02184 
(0.00076) 
**** 0.00025 
(0.00000) 
**** 0,36749 
(0,02094) 
**** 0,64885 
(0,03644) 
**** 1458,56 **** 
AIG -0.00002 
(0.00001) 
 0.01396 
(0.00064) 
**** 0.00014 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.26829 
(0.01838) 
**** 0.34966 
(0.01877) 
**** 1033.34 **** 
AMGN -0.00016 
(0.00002) 
**** -0.05324 
(0.00149) 
**** 0.00037 
(0.00001) 
**** 0.37835 
(0.02017) 
**** 0.36876 
(0.00802) 
**** 3747.16 **** 
BUD 0.00001 
(0.00002) 
 -0.04599 
(0.00229) 
**** 0.00014 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.07805 
(0.00553) 
**** 0.09981 
(0.00677) 
**** 820.09 **** 
AVP 0.00000 
(0.00001) 
 0.06655 
(0.00122) 
**** 0.00017 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.12754 
(0.00284) 
**** 0.15925 
(0.00311) 
**** 7612.61 **** 
BHI 0.00004 
(0.00001) 
**** -0.00024 
(0.00011) 
 0.00103 
(0.00001) 
**** -0.85321 
(0.17481) 
*** -0.37460 
(32.50879) 
 28.99 **** 
ONE -0.00008 
(0.00001) 
**** 0.03196 
(0.00040) 
**** 0.00022 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.17948 
(0.00272) 
**** 0.26131 
(0.00632) 
**** 12432.67 **** 
BAC 0.00029 
(0.00001) 
**** 0.02923 
(0.00061) 
**** 0.00021 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.21413 
(0.00642) 
**** 0.57640 
(0.01896) 
**** 4329.51 **** 
BAX 0.00000 
(0.00002) 
 -0.03863 
(0.00156) 
**** 0.00027 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.25563 
(0.01394) 
**** 0.14613 
(0.00927) 
**** 1195.12 **** 
BDK 0.00006 
(0.00001) 
**** 0.02335 
(0.00063) 
**** 0.00035 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.49532 
(0.01786) 
**** 0.64242 
(0.02838) 
**** 2672.57 **** 
BA 0.00000 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00066 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00029 
(0.00000) 
**** 7.51485 
(0.31430) 
**** 42.62593 
(1.14540) 
**** 7171370.31 **** 
BCC 0.00000 
(0.00000) 
**** -0.00026 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00042 
(0.00001) 
**** 62.91754 
(2.89269) 
**** 31.71839 
(1.72156) 
**** 415385.53 **** 
BMY 0.00002 
(0.00000) 
**** -0.00289 
(0.00001) 
**** 0.00015 
(0.00000) 
**** 1.21615 
(0.03553) 
**** 3.73679 
(0.08118) 
**** 64550.23 **** 
BNI -0.00009 
(0.00001) 
**** 0.01996 
(0.00046) 
**** 0.00022 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.31274 
(0.01038) 
**** 0.27564 
(0.00963) 
**** 3572.89 **** 
CI 0.00000 
(0.00002) 
 0.05139 
(0.00192) 
**** 0.00017 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.14706 
(0.00777) 
**** 0.10739 
(0.00703) 
**** 1305.35 **** 
CPB -0.00011 
(0.00001) 
**** -0.06755 
(0.00131) 
**** 0.00018 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.11682 
(0.00302) 
**** 0.06419 
(0.00187) 
**** 5333.10 **** 
CSCO -0.00006 
(0.00001) 
**** -0.02444 
(0.00070) 
**** 0.00027 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.46505 
(0.02479) 
**** 0.60757 
(0.01760) 
**** 2752.97 **** 
C 0.00001 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00153 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00023 
(0.00000) 
**** 5.85449 
(0.21123) 
**** 11.60541 
(0.59447) 
**** 216508.57 **** 
CCU 0.00000 
(0.00000) 
**** -0.00033 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00015 
(0.00000) 
**** 16.73174 
(0.43956) 
**** 16.77639 
(0.27246) 
**** 1446000.83 **** 
KO 0.00000 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00199 
(0.00003) 
**** 0.00014 
(0.00000) 
**** 2.46892 
(0.11483) 
**** 2.10787 
(0.07104) 
**** 6530.11 **** 
CL 0.00000 
(0.00000) 
**** -0.00017 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00014 
(0.00000) 
**** 29.04272 
(1.29694) 
**** 31.29416 
(0.86090) 
**** 1250460.22 **** 
CSC -0.00009 
(0.00002) 
* 0.06377 
(0.00199) 
**** 0.00020 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.12379 
(0.00589) 
**** 0.12675 
(0.00512) 
**** 2079.53 **** 
DAL -0.00009 
(0.00003) 
 0.04596 
(0.00188) 
**** 0.00031 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.15984 
(0.01072) 
**** 0.18536 
(0.01063) 
**** 1124.62 **** 
Standard Errors in parentheses; Beta parameters with p-value > 0.05 in bold type 
 * p-value < 0.05 
 ** p-value < 0.01 
 *** p-value < 0.001 
 **** p-value < 0.0001  
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Table 1.  Firm-specific estimates of parameters of the econometric model (continued) 
Ticker ai bi s2(å i) b 1i b 2i Wald statistic 
DOW 0.00001 
(0.00000) 
**** -0.00333 
(0.00003) 
**** 0.00016 
(0.00000) 
**** 2.00795 
(0.07080) 
**** 2.59502 
(0.09529) 
**** 13842.78 **** 
DD -0.00005 
(0.00001) 
**** -0.03204 
(0.00075) 
**** 0.00015 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.32985 
(0.01100) 
**** 0.21028 
(0.00600) 
**** 3974.91 **** 
EMC -0.00012 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.01550 
(0.00026) 
**** 0.00037 
(0.00001) 
**** 1.95065 
(0.09496) 
**** 1.42368 
(0.03313) 
**** 5842.72 **** 
EK 0.00000 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00016 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00023 
(0.00000) 
**** 76.07562 
(0.91654) 
**** 35.68132 
(1.58565) 
**** 791821.68 **** 
EP -0.00016 
(0.00003) 
**** 0.05327 
(0.00257) 
**** 0.00016 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.12589 
(0.01198) 
**** 0.10630 
(0.00706) 
**** 767.58 **** 
ETR 0.00001 
(0.00000) 
**** -0.00084 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00011 
(0.00000) 
**** 5.07670 
(0.05994) 
**** 14.51618 
(0.69811) 
**** 476035.50 **** 
EXC 0.00000 
(0.00001) 
 -0.01780 
(0.00092) 
**** 0.00014 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.26737 
(0.01906) 
**** 0.12707 
(0.01358) 
**** 658.01 **** 
XOM 0.00000 
(0.00004) 
 -0.06699 
(0.00339) 
**** 0.00013 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.04946 
(0.00402) 
**** 0.03700 
(0.00401) 
**** 627.49 **** 
FDX -0.00021 
(0.00002) 
**** 0.03583 
(0.00092) 
**** 0.00029 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.47568 
(0.02180) 
**** 0.32624 
(0.01175) 
**** 2756.21 **** 
F 0.00036 
(0.00002) 
**** -0.03869 
(0.00139) 
**** 0.00030 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.16006 
(0.00602) 
**** 0.22371 
(0.00435) 
**** 4127.51 **** 
GD 0.00023 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.01891 
(0.00012) 
**** 0.00016 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.23182 
(0.00409) 
**** 1.88805 
(0.06256) 
**** 29713.16 **** 
GE 0.00000 
(0.00002) 
 -0.02602 
(0.00145) 
**** 0.00013 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.11646 
(0.00893) 
**** 0.14253 
(0.01174) 
**** 640.35 **** 
GM -0.00013 
(0.00002) 
**** 0.03155 
(0.00145) 
**** 0.00031 
(0.00001) 
**** 0.28638 
(0.02528) 
**** 0.19428 
(0.01632) 
**** 741.80 **** 
G 0.00000 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00294 
(0.00002) 
**** 0.00015 
(0.00000) 
**** 2.84730 
(0.05981) 
**** 2.92671 
(0.04754) 
**** 43359.39 **** 
HCA 0.00016 
(0.00001) 
**** 0.01960 
(0.00076) 
**** 0.00040 
(0.00001) 
**** 0.37533 
(0.01777) 
**** 0.65607 
(0.05017) 
**** 1276.85 **** 
HAL -0.00042 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.01158 
(0.00012) 
**** 0.00046 
(0.00001) 
**** 7.48346 
(0.51784) 
**** 0.50408 
(0.01557) 
**** 10967.55 **** 
HET 0.00002 
(0.00000) 
**** -0.00396 
(0.00003) 
**** 0.00067 
(0.00001) 
**** 4.22423 
(0.18228) 
**** 5.50119 
(0.36350) 
**** 22863.04 **** 
HIG 0.00003 
(0.00012) 
 0.04986 
(0.00198) 
**** 0.00018 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00000 
(0.00006) 
 0.13711 
(0.00407) 
**** 1768.04 **** 
HNZ 0.00000 
(0.00013) 
 -0.03918 
(0.00582) 
**** 0.00065 
(0.00002) 
**** 0.13158 
(0.03042) 
** 0.09104 
(0.01639) 
**** 94.88 **** 
HWP 0.00000 
(0.00002) 
 -0.03788 
(0.00138) 
**** 0.00033 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.22301 
(0.01212) 
**** 0.32770 
(0.01237) 
**** 1792.25 **** 
HD -0.00002 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00336 
(0.00002) 
**** 0.00018 
(0.00000) 
**** 3.56056 
(0.19729) 
**** 1.92086 
(0.02075) 
**** 31138.98 **** 
HON 0.00000 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00037 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00018 
(0.00000) 
**** 23.68995 
(0.39660) 
**** 19.70041 
(0.42498) 
**** 274519.03 **** 
INTC 0.00000 
(0.00000) 
**** -0.00017 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00035 
(0.00000) 
**** 45.65086 
(2.41163) 
**** 48.95842 
(3.60856) 
**** 968471.83 **** 
IBM 0.00000 
(0.00000) 
**** -0.00058 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00029 
(0.00000) 
**** 30.35934 
(1.48797) 
**** 14.20691 
(0.49665) 
**** 119795.78 **** 
IP -0.00002 
(0.00000) 
**** -0.00381 
(0.00008) 
**** 0.00024 
(0.00000) 
**** 2.36199 
(0.07360) 
**** 0.62795 
(0.02757) 
**** 3743.27 **** 
JPM 0.00042 
(0.00002) 
**** 0.04636 
(0.00133) 
**** 0.00026 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.16327 
(0.00505) 
**** 0.44999 
(0.02193) 
**** 2679.62 **** 
JNJ 0.00003 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00584 
(0.00010) 
**** 0.00016 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.87919 
(0.04793) 
**** 1.75057 
(0.09767) 
**** 4306.19 **** 
LEH 0.00026 
(0.00000) 
**** -0.02245 
(0.00009) 
**** 0.00028 
(0.00001) 
**** 0.95697 
(0.02168) 
**** 2.77130 
(0.08439) 
**** 64360.44 **** 
Standard Errors in parentheses; Beta parameters with p-value > 0.05 in bold type 
 * p-value < 0.05 
 ** p-value < 0.01 
 *** p-value < 0.001 
 **** p-value < 0.0001  
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Table 1. Firm-specific estimates of parameters of the econometric model (continued) 
Ticker ai bi s2(å i) b 1i b 2i Wald statistic 
LTD 0.00000 
(0.00000) 
**** -0.00190 
(0.00001) 
**** 0.00044 
(0.00001) 
**** 6.51690 
(0.33571) 
**** 6.44938 
(0.35393) 
**** 25727.24 **** 
LU 0.00035 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.01336 
(0.00001) 
**** 0.00020 
(0.00000) 
**** -0.00001 
(0.00003) 
 3.70411 
(0.01804) 
**** 3585049.04 **** 
MAY 0.00008 
(0.00001) 
**** -0.02629 
(0.00127) 
**** 0.00022 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.17097 
(0.01123) 
**** 0.23357 
(0.01134) 
**** 1084.14 **** 
MCD 0.00000 
(0.00001) 
 0.01674 
(0.00075) 
**** 0.00034 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.52860 
(0.03 588) 
**** 0.49831 
(0.03633) 
**** 904.68 **** 
MEDI -0.00094 
(0.00000) 
**** -0.03680 
(0.00020) 
**** 0.00191 
(0.00004) 
**** 6.64815 
(0.12829) 
**** 3.43530 
(0.03739) 
**** 43804.65 **** 
MDT 0.00000 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00127 
(0.00001) 
**** 0.00026 
(0.00000) 
**** 5.36967 
(0.40450) 
**** 6.84266 
(0.40878) 
**** 20181.42 **** 
MRK 0.00006 
(0.00000) 
**** -0.00814 
(0.00009) 
**** 0.00017 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.81357 
(0.03318) 
**** 1.91651 
(0.09281) 
**** 9052.37 **** 
MER 0.00000 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00007 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00022 
(0.00000) 
**** 67.47695 
(2.26074) 
**** 69.66400 
(1.00258) 
**** 24402774.1 **** 
MSFT 0.00000 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00006 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00022 
(0.00000) 
**** 72.51121 
(2.42958) 
**** 74.90687 
(1.07808) 
**** 28208647.4 **** 
MMM 0.00000 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00046 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00012 
(0.00000) 
**** 10.25278 
(0.40779) 
**** 28.20995 
(1.26869) 
**** 1597207.48 **** 
MWD 0.00020 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.01473 
(0.00019) 
**** 0.00028 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.43807 
(0.01767) 
**** 1.76599 
(0.13999) 
**** 7082.13 **** 
NXTL 0.00000 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00104 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00202 
(0.00002) 
**** 42.36717 
(1.58182) 
**** 39.88253 
(1.41134) 
**** 1243921.50 **** 
NSM -0.00012 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.01955 
(0.00019) 
**** 0.00110 
(0.00001) 
**** 2.64449 
(0.04812) 
**** 1.92343 
(0.05144) 
**** 14863.75 **** 
NSC 0.00000 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00006 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00016 
(0.00000) 
**** 111.24529 
(2.39148) 
**** 62.82893 
(1.27260) 
**** 8541559.85 **** 
NT -0.00032 
(0.00002) 
**** 0.09693 
(0.00179) 
**** 0.00032 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.18378 
(0.00472) 
**** 0.11738 
(0.00388) 
**** 5358.67 **** 
ORCL 0.00057 
(0.00001) 
**** -0.05555 
(0.00059) 
**** 0.00056 
(0.00001) 
**** 0.79239 
(0.01190) 
**** 1.03347 
(0.02297) 
**** 15264.41 **** 
PEP 0.00000 
(0.00003) 
 -0.05119 
(0.00186) 
**** 0.00022 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.17504 
(0.00922) 
**** 0.15311 
(0.00814) 
**** 1473.17 **** 
PFE 0.00000 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00094 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00017 
(0.00000) 
**** 7.06910 
(0.30375) 
**** 8.28843 
(0.37207) 
**** 62332.62 **** 
PHA 0.00000 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00068 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00020 
(0.00000) 
**** 17.41077 
(0.27164) 
**** 16.10054 
(0.24607) 
**** 1569158.43 **** 
MO 0.00026 
(0.00000) 
**** -0.04872 
(0.00076) 
**** 0.00022 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.29436 
(0.00275) 
**** 0.25076 
(0.00387) 
**** 19747.38 **** 
PG 0.00006 
(0.00000) 
**** -0.02171 
(0.00015) 
**** 0.00013 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.23054 
(0.00130) 
**** 0.42488 
(0.00995) 
**** 55107.81 **** 
RSH 0.00016 
(0.00002) 
**** 0.05396 
(0.00132) 
**** 0.00028 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.19537 
(0.00541) 
**** 0.33513 
(0.01450) 
**** 3519.44 **** 
ROK 0.00000 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00030 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00019 
(0.00000) 
**** 42.16846 
(1.25048) 
**** 32.04724 
(0.61210) 
**** 1044830.94 **** 
SLE -0.00005 
(0.00001) 
**** -0.02273 
(0.00054) 
**** 0.00016 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.30849 
(0.01046) 
**** 0.29743 
(0.00670) 
**** 4589.16 **** 
SBC -0.00001 
(0.00002) 
 -0.04732 
(0.00159) 
**** 0.00015 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.09128 
(0.00422) 
**** 0.09833 
(0.00330) 
**** 2236.58 **** 
SLB 0.00000 
(0.00000) 
**** -0.00085 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00026 
(0.00000) 
**** 11.32617 
(0.45321) 
**** 20.56762 
(0.53673) 
**** 1211623.64 **** 
S 0.00002 
(0.00000) 
**** -0.00478 
(0.00004) 
**** 0.00022 
(0.00000) 
**** 2.11264 
(0.04941) 
**** 2.49513 
(0.07723) 
**** 19168.68 **** 
SO 0.00001 
(0.00001) 
 -0.00568 
(0.00060) 
**** 0.00012 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.18352 
(0.02414) 
**** 0.23941 
(0.02857) 
**** 217.83 **** 
Standard Errors in parentheses; Beta parameters with p-value > 0.05 in bold type 
 * p-value < 0.05 
 ** p-value < 0.01 
 *** p-value < 0.001 
 **** p-value < 0.0001  
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Table 1. Firm-specific estimates of parameters of the econometric model (continued) 
Ticker ai bi s2(å i) b 1i b 2i Wald statistic  
TXN -0.00001 
(0.00000) 
**** -0.00483 
(0.00011) 
**** 0.00050 
(0.00001) 
**** 3.65502 
(0.18200) 
**** 1.75878 
(0.11386) 
**** 2420.45 **** 
TOY 0.00000 
(0.00000) 
**** -0.00060 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00043 
(0.00001) 
**** 14.45354 
(0.49905) 
**** 19.20345 
(0.94440) 
**** 362695.40 **** 
TYC 0.00006 
(0.00001) 
**** 0.05964 
(0.00112) 
**** 0.00022 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.20545 
(0.00414) 
**** 0.15824 
(0.00726) 
**** 5784.12 **** 
USB 0.00000 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00069 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00016 
(0.00000) 
**** 5.55825 
(0.10016) 
**** 13.34574 
(0.08709) 
**** 5199129.72 **** 
UIS 0.00153 
(0.00001) 
**** -0.08621 
(0.00031) 
**** 0.00077 
(0.00001) 
**** 0.96128 
(0.00546) 
**** 1.29328 
(0.01164) 
**** 118765.13 **** 
UTX 0.00018 
(0.00002) 
**** 0.05160 
(0.00236) 
**** 0.00017 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.09662 
(0.00553) 
**** 0.15594 
(0.00736) 
**** 1230.56 **** 
VZ 0.00000 
(0.00000) 
* -0.00224 
(0.00002) 
**** 0.00015 
(0.00000) 
**** 2.99074 
(0.08552) 
**** 2.30141 
(0.06851) 
**** 11097.91 **** 
VIA -0.00028 
(0.00006) 
*** 0.11835 
(0.00330) 
**** 0.00053 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.18977 
(0.00850) 
**** 0.12614 
(0.00582) 
**** 2250.28 **** 
WMT -0.00004 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.01395 
(0.00032) 
**** 0.00047 
(0.00001) 
**** 1.24535 
(0.06612) 
**** 1.13159 
(0.04523) 
**** 2831.51 **** 
DIS -0.00013 
(0.00003) 
**** -0.05243 
(0.00171) 
**** 0.00022 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.14213 
(0.00695) 
**** 0.05249 
(0.00321) 
**** 1620.53 **** 
WFC 0.00005 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.00466 
(0.00002) 
**** 0.00017 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.81478 
(0.04259) 
**** 3.34699 
(0.12918) 
**** 53514.10 **** 
WY 0.00007 
(0.00001) 
*** -0.02603 
(0.00122) 
**** 0.00029 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.24034 
(0.01318) 
**** 0.11803 
(0.01146) 
**** 892.82 **** 
WMB 0.00010 
(0.00001) 
**** 0.01947 
(0.00085) 
**** 0.00022 
(0.00000) 
**** 0.21310 
(0.01174) 
**** 0.43456 
(0.02259) 
**** 1223.08 **** 
XRX 0.00000 
(0.00000) 
 -0.00462 
(0.00001) 
**** 0.00017 
(0.00000) 
**** 2.20041 
(0.00506) 
**** 1.14983 
(0.00187) 
**** 1262786.11 **** 
Standard Errors in parentheses; Beta parameters with p-value > 0.05 in bold type 
 * p-value < 0.05 
 ** p-value < 0.01 
 *** p-value < 0.001 
 **** p-value < 0.0001 
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Figure 1. Double risk-return relationship hypothesized by behavioral theories 
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